Hume’s moral scepticism

Hume and Cheyne : Against the opinion of E.C. Mossner (The Life of David Hume) I re-proposed Dr. Cheyne as a probable recipient of the letter to the Scottish Physician. (See Hume’s Moral Scepticism, pp. 24-28).

Hutcheson and Sympathy : Against the opinion of N. Kemp Smith (and of E.C. Mossner) I argued: ‘But, first of all, the doctrine of sympathy is intrinsically alien to Hutcheson’s conception: it was precisely the doctrine that the adversaries of moral sense used against him to justify the presence of apparently disinterested behaviours and of disinterested moral approval; it was only for this reason that Hutcheson had taken care of this. (Hume’s Moral Scepticism, p. 142). This thesis, drawn above all from the pages of the Essay on passions, I then documented in an analytical way both in the introduction to the Italian translation of the Essay, Bologna, Clueb, 1997 and in Sympathy and Moral sense, 1725-1740 (British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol 7, n . 1 March 1999, pp. 79-101). Again in the book:  Hutcheson, Hume, senso morale e simpatia, Bologna, Clueb, 2007.

Hume and Jane Austen : On page 115-17 of Hume’s moral skepticism I noticed a close affinity between a passage from Dissertation on passions and passages from the magnificent novels of Jane Austen. In a note, I added that ‘the humian characteristic of Austen’s characters would perhaps deserve a particular investigation’. I note with pleasure that finally in 2009 E.M. Dadlez has published Mirrors to One AnotherEmotion and Value in Jane Austen and David Hume. (Wiley-Blackwell-Oxford) (related papers published between 2006-2008).